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DANISH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT
Finn Tarp and Mads Vaczy Kragh'
1. INTRODUCTION
This study was initiated at the request of the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague and forms
parts of an international comparative analysis of the historical evolution of balance of payments
support (BOP) and the methodologies adopted by aid donors in the evaluation of such assistance. The
study covers the period 1988-94, and BOP support is defined so as to include import support, debt
relief as well as other forms of programme aid. More specifically, the following forms of general
programme assistance as defined in the DAC 'Principles for Programme Assistance' (DAC, 1991)
are included in addition to debt relief: balance of payments support, general budget support and
commodity aid not related to specitic projects. Hence, the remaining two categories of programme
assistance (programme food aid and sector programme assistance) are not included.
Data on Danish BOP are, with the exception of debt relief, not compiled in summary form in
Danida's annual reports or other similar published sources. Thus, to provide an overview of the
composition and trends of disbursements of such aid, the detailed accounts of all ongoing BOP
activities had to be reviewed. The relevant BOP projects were identitied from the short descriptive
outlines contained in the so-called project approval and completion reports prepared by the Research
and Evaluation Unit (StS.4) of Danida. On the basis of this listing, the Finance Department for
Development Assistance (StS.2) was in a position to supply the data, which could subsequently be
transformed by the authors into the summary tables presented here. It is noted, however, that the
information available does not allow a breakdown of the support to respectively Open General License
(OGL) systems and credit lines, whereas commodity import support (CIS), debt relief and co-
tinancing with the World Bank are in general identifiable categories.
Evaluation of Danish aid is the direct responsibility of StS.4, and on average 3 per cent of all Danish
aid is evaluated by this unit with the assistance of external consultants. In addition to the evaluation
studies, internal Danida reviews are carried out at various stages of project implementation involving
the Technical Advisory Service (TSA), and also the Danish Court of Auditors produce studies, which
are of direct relevance to the evaluation of Danish aid. However, due to the rather limited size of
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limited part of the BOP was explicitly linked to the implementation of policy conditionalities.
Figure 1: Danish Balance of Payments Support 1988-1994
With regard to the main recipients of Danish BOP, as shown in table 2, eight countries account on
average for 84 per cent of the to~ BOP. This degree of concentration has, however, been falling
significantly throughout the whole period from a level of 99 per cent in 1988 to 68 per cent in 1994.
All eight countries (Le., Bangladesh, Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Kenya and
Nicaragua in order of decreasing importance) are so called programme co\llltries (Le., major receivers
of Danish bilateral aid). Yet, Bangladesh and Tanzania have been by far the most important receivers
of Danish BOP. Nevertheless, by 1994 BOP to Bangladesh had come to an almost complete stand-
still, and BOP to Tanzania had diminished to only 16 per cent of the 1988 level in nominal terms.
Also BOP to Nicaragua and Kenya had fallen to very low levels in 1994, whereas these drops were
counteracted by increased BOP to Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Danish BOP to Zambia and Uganda
has followed no obvious trend.
Table 1 Danish Balance of Payments Support, 1988-1994
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total
Total BOP 243.1 329.8 286.3 462.0 360.5 278.4 218.3
2,178.0
Support
As a share of 9.0 10.0 8.0 12.0 9.0 6.0
5.0 8.0
bilateral aid
As a share of 4.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 4.0 3.0 2.0
4.0
total aid
Source: Danida S15.2
2, msrORICAL EVOLUfION
Although policy-based aid has been the subject of intense debate during the 1980s and 19905 in
Denmark, this kind of aid has not so far played any significant role in Danish international
development assistance in contrast to the situation for other like-minded donors such as Sweden,
Norway and the Netherlands. Total Danish BOP given during 1988-94 amounted to only DKK 2.2
billion corresponding to US$ 0.4 billion (see Table 1). This is equivalent to approximately eight per
Section 2 provides a descriptive historical summary of Danish BOP with tables and figures indicating
the importance of BOP in the overall aid programme. Breakdowns of the BOP assistance by main
recipients and categories are also given, and the same accounts for the composition of the commodity
import support programme. Subsequently, Section 3 identifies the main policy and other guidelines
governing Danish BOP, and Section 4 reviews and characterizes existing BOP studies. Section 5
concludes and identifies the main lessons.
Danish BOP only one major evaluation study covering five countries (Tanzania, Mozambique,
Uganda, Nicaragua and Bangladesh) has been carried out by Danida (see T&B Consult, 1994). In
addition there are three minor reports from the late 19805 (CASA, 1989; Cooksey, 1987; and Danida,
1988) covering BOP activities in Tanzania and Mozambique. This study is based on these four
analyses, but also the methodologies used in the internal reviews are commented upon below.
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cent of the bilateral, and four per cent of the total, Danish aid budget for the whole period, and the
trend has been on a pronounced decline from 1991 as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, only a very
2
It can also be observed that Danish BOP has been concentrated on some of the poorest countries in
the world, including in particular a relatively large number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This
3
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is in line with overall Danish aid priorities, where the extent and level of poverty is an important if
not overriding criteria. It also follows that the number of receivers of Danish BOP increased from
1988 to 1995. This took place through the inclusion of countries such as Egypt, Cape Verde, Nepal,
Mongolia, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Kirgizstan, listed here in decreasing order of significance.
Other countries, which have received BOP in the 1988-94 period, include Angola, Benin, Bolivia,
Eritrea, Guyana and Honduras.
Table 2 Main recipients of Danish Balance of Payments Support
1988-1994 (OKK millions)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total
Share
Bangladesh 106.9 156.7 141.3 143.3 55.0 -21.8
0.8 582.2 26.9
Kenya 2.4 30.4 17.5 30.8 17.4 4.2
0.5 103.2 4.8
Mozambique 9.9 13.5 9.4 7.5 27.8 40.7
35.1 143.9 6.6
Tanzania 104.2 76.9 91.8 139.6 50.8 3.1
16.7 483.1 22.3
Uganda 12.5 10.0 5.7 35.6 40.6 71.9
8.6 184.9 8.5
zambia 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.1 60.5 23.8
22.5 124.9 5.8
Zimbabwe 3.6 15.4 0.0 0.0 25.0 35.
62.8 141.8 6.5
Nicaragua 0.0 12.0 15.3 38.4 0.6 ~.4 0.0
65.7 3.0
Total (millions 239.5 314.9 281.0 413.3 271.7 156.5 147.0 1829.7
84
DKK)
Share of main 99.0 95.0 98.0 89.0 76.0 57
68 84
recipients
Note: Negative shares are due to insurance coverage of damaged goods.
Source: Danida StS.2
The major component of Danish BOP in 1988-94 has by far been commodity import support (CIS).
which on average accounted for close to 71 per cent of all BOP (Table 3). This share has, however,
dropped consistently from 95 per cent in 1988 to only 38 per cent in 1994. Hence. while CIS in
1994 was still the largest component of Danish BOP, it was by no means the only modality used.
One important characteristic of the CIS modality has been the possibility for rapid disbursement of
unspent project funds at the end of the year in a residual manner to finance inputs to production
activities. Yet, the CIS mechanism has at the same time made it possible for Danida to increase the
4
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share of the aid budgets received by Danish suppliers due to tying.
10 fact, it would appear that the CIS modality has been used more with a view to the need for high
disbursement and procurement in Denmark than being due to a perceived superiority of this aid
instrument with reference to the particular needs of receiving countries. This fact is underscored in
a recent official report on programme assistance, which inter alia reports that prices for Danish CIS
goods have in some cases been above world market prices (Oanida, 1994: 8-9). It is, moreover,
confirmed that problems of proper planning and monitoring have in all likelihood been encountered
as compared to present norms and regulations. These problems are not, however, specified in detail.
It can also be noted that the demand in receiving countries for the kinds of Danish goods, which have
been used so far, has almost fallen away. Importers have less incentive to buy CIS goods tied to
Danish suppliers such as fertilizers or cement at market prices once their economies are opened up
and previous implicit subsidies due to overvalued exchange rates and non-payment of counterpart
Table 3 Main categories of Danish Balance of Payments Support, 1988-1994
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total
CIS! 230.6 299.8 270.6 301.9 242.3 108.2 82.9 1.536.3
Share oftotal BOP (%) 94.9 90.9 94.5 65.3 67.2 38.9 38.0 70.5
Debt relief(mill.DKK) 0.0 0.0 1.7 134.2 20.2 52.2 21.5 229.8
Share of total BOP (%) 0.0 0.0 0.6 29.0 5.6 18.8 9.8 10.5
Support of credit lines 12.5 30.0 14.0 25.9 58.0 78.0 98.6 316.0
and OGL'
Share of total BOP (%) 5.1 9.1 4.9 5.7 16.1 28.0 45.2 14.5
Co-fmancing of World 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 15.3 95.3
Bank SAP' credits
Share of total BOP (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 14.3 7.0 4.4
Total 243.1 329.8 286.3 462.0 360.5 278.4 218.3 2,178.0
Notes: (1) CIS - Commodity Import Support; (2) OGL - Open General Licence System' aod (3)
SAP - Structural Adjustment Programme. •
Source: Danida StS.2
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funds are removed (see Rekve and Torp, 1995, for further comments in this regard). Yet, this does
not rule out a priori a potentially useful role for commodity support. The users of such aid can be
given the necessary subsidy elements in a variety of different ways, if they were not contemplating
to buy the goods on strictly commercial terms.
In line with the falling trend for CIS, other import assistance in the form of support to open general
license (OOL) systems and credit lines grew from hardly anything in 1988 to 45 per cent of Danish
BOP in 1994. Credit lines consisting of foreign exchange transferred to Central Banks in the
receiving countries have been used as a way of facilitating tying to purchases in Demnark. Thus,
seen from the receiving countries' point of view this modality suffered from shortcomings similar to
those of the CIS mechanism, and it has opened up considerable possibilities for corruption due to the
sizeable economic rents involved. Limited knowledge in the receiving countries about Danish
suppliers have, in addition, served as a constraint to making more effective use of the credit line
modality.
Funds transferred in connection with OGL systems have so far mainly been disbursed as co- or
parallel financing with the World Bank. Hence, foreign exchange has been supplied and sold to
importers through different kinds of auctioning systems, increasing the import capacity of the country
in question and financing in this way the import of goods contained in long positive lists or excluded
by short negative lists. Danish OGL funds have normally been used to underpin the implementation
of liberalization policies, and it follows that tying to purchases in donor countries is less feasible,
since no implicit subsidy element is involved for the importer.
Nevertheless, the OGL modality can in weak institutional systems suffer from exactly the same
problems as the CIS system, when it comes to non-payment of counterpart funds and potentially
arbitrary ways of getting access (Le., license) to the foreign currency provided. This can only be
avoided if due care is taken in the design as well as in the implementation stage. Moreover, data on
the OGL instrument are particularly difficult to interpret. Disbursed means in this context disbursed
by Danida to World Bank accounts, but this does not imply that the funds involved have actually been
released to the country in question. This is inter alia important, since it would appear that there are
several instances where the World Bank has preferred to use own funds before releasing donor
money, making the link between the disbursement figures and their actual use even more tenuous.
6
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It can, finally, be highlighted that transferring resources to poor countries in the form of foreign
currency remains a relevant aid modality independent of the need for OGL mechanisms during a
transition period where economic reforms are undertaken. Even if the currency of a given country
is fully convertible and the foreign exchange market operates efficiently, domestic savings may still
be insufficient to satisfy existing basic human needs and meet the investments required for future
growth. In this case, foreign support (Le., savings) amounts simply to a supplement to domestic
savings and as such is equivalent to general budget aid, since there is, in other words, no difference,
in principle, between financing selected COmponents of the budget or providing a free allocation of
foreign exchange.
Debt relief was an important component of Danish BOP during the period 1979-87 when an amount
of almost DKK 2.2 billion of Danish state loans owed by some 15 least developed countries and a
few low-income countries were cancelled in accordance with the UNCTAD-declaration of II March
1978 (Danida, various years). Yet, during the subsequent period in focus in this study, debt relief
amounted to only 10 per cent of total BOP, although it reached almost 30 per cent in some years.
SAP cofinancing is the last component of Danish BOP. This modality has been used since 1991, and
has on average accounted for 4.4 per cent of total BOP. This share has, moreover, been relatively
stable, in contrast to other policy related aid.
The evolution of total BOP from Danida and its importance in the overall aid programme, the
distribution by major recipients and the composition by category are issues already discussed above.
Yet, in relation to Danish BOP, a distinctive feature has also been the use of only one or two
instruments in no less than five out of the eight main recipients. More specifically, the major
recipient of Danish BOP, Bangladesh, received this aid eXclusively as CIS (see Table 4). In addition,
two-thirds of the BOP assistance to Bangladesh can as shown in Table 5 be classified as fertilizers.
Fertilizer provided to Bangladesh was therefore equivalent to a remarkable 18 per cent of total Danish
BOP during the period 1988-94. The total share of Danish fertilizer supplied amounted to an equally
impressive share of 23 per cent.
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Table 4 Danish Balance or Payments Support by category and main recipients Table 5 Danisb Commodity Import Support by category and main recipients
Countries CIS Debt Relief OGL and Credit Co-financing of
lines World Bank Commodity Fertilizers Cement Spare parts Technical Unspecified Other
Import soap CIS' CIS'
Bangladesh 582.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 Support
43.2 0.0 60.0 0.0 Bangladesh 391.7 0.0 57.1 0.0 0.0 133.4Kenya
Mozambique 48.9 0.0 40.0 55.3 Kenya 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.2
Tanzania 382.8 90.5 9.8 0.0 Mozambique 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.1 12.5 11.3
Uganda 66.9 34.6 83.4 0.0 Tanzania 79.7 103.8 0.0 14.1 89.3 95.9
Zambia 84.9 0.0 0.0 40.0 Uganda 0.0 52.1 0.0 14.8 0.0 0.0
Zimbabwe 19.0 0.0 122.8 0.0 Zambia 38.1 0.0 46.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nicaragua 31.9 33.8 0.0 0.0 Zimbabwe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0
Others 276.5 70.9 0.0 0.0 Nicaragua 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 29.5
Total 1536.3 229.8 316.0 95.3 Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 276.6
Source: Danida StS.2 Total 509.5 155.9 106.3 54.0 101.8 608.8
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A number of the main recipients of Danish BOP, which received a substantial share of the BOP as
CIS in the early years of the 1988-94 period, experienced a structural shift in the composition of the
BOP from the early years of the 1990s. Tanzania received substantial amounts of CIS in the form
of cement during the years 1988-91, amounting to 21 per cent of total BOP to Tanzania during the
period 1988-94. Yet, in 1991 Tanzania had DKK 90.5 billion of debt to the Danish Export Credit
Council relieved in accordance with the so called Toronto terms and parallel financing on a limited
scale with the World Bank was used as a modality in 1994.
Co-fmancing with the World Bank on a considerable scale in relative terms has only been used in
Mozambique and Zambia; but parallel financing with the World Bank was used as a modality in
Kenya (OGLIcredit lines), Zimbabwe (OGLlcredit lines), Uganda (debt relief and OGLlcredit lines),
Mozambique (OGLlcredit lines), and Nicaragua (debt relief). It would for analytical purposes have
been desirable to be able to distinguish here between OGL support, which is untied in nature and
generally implemented in col1aboration with the World Bank, and the credit lines, which have
typically been tied to purchases in Denmark or developing countries. However, this has, as already
mentioned, not been possible based on the information available.
8
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Notes: (I) Unspecified Commodity Import Support usually indicated that the CIS consists of a
wide group of different commodities and therefore these are not specified any further in the
short programme description; and (2) Other Commodity Import Support includes cables,
medicine, road rol1ers, seeds etc.
Source: Danida StS.2
Disbursements to OGL systems and credit lines, listed under headings such as balance of payments
support and structural adjustment in the brief project descriptions from StS.4, have been made under
the same file numbers. To be able to distinguish in detail between OGL and credit line figures would
therefore require a careful review of all the Danida Board documents on the basis of which this aid
was approved. This would clearly be beyond the scope of this study, but it is known that common
practice has been to approve OGLlcredit line packages where 50 per cent would be used for untied
OGL support and the remaining 50 per cent for tied credit lines. This practice can, in other words,
be seen as a way of balancing the twin needs of Danida for rapid disbursement and tying against each
other. One would, however, be hard pressed to argue that this can be justified based on an analysis
of the particular situation and developmental needs of the receiving country.
9
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3. POLICY AND OTHER GUIDELINES
A review of existing Danida strategy and policy documents as well as annual reports and similar
publications mentioned in the list of references reveals that there is no clearly defined set of policies
related specifically to Danish BOP. A study on programme aid contains a variety of general
considerations as to when and where the various BOP modalities may be more or less appropriate
(Danida, 1994a: 31-33). Vet, these considerations do not make up a policy as such. It would,
moreover, on the basis of the documents and interviews undertaken in relation to this study appear
that there are, indeed, no examples of Danish BOP having been used as policy based aid in the sense
that explicit conditionalities were attached.
The lack of policy guidelines is particularly pronounced in relation to the CIS. The CIS has mainly
been used as a means of quickly disbursing in a residual and tied manner any unspent aid funds at
the end of the year due to lack of absorptive capacity in the receiving country as measured by the
annual Danida aid allocation to the country in question (see also T&B Consult, 1994). Whether such
CIS aid would further or delay a process of economic reforms has evidently not been a matter of
concern, and macroeconomic gap-based considerations certainly did not form part of the decision
making process. Rather, the CIS modality has, in addition to being a rapid disbursement mechanism,
been viewed as a useful way of increasing procurement in Denmark. This is put further into
perspective by the fact that Danida has found it impossible to reach a level of disbursements through
Danish suppliers equivalent to 50 per cent of the aid budget, which was established in 1988 as a
,
declaration of intent.
The structural shift in the composition of Danish BOP, which took place after 1991 could possibly
be a signal that a more policy based approach was taken. However, it can safely be hypothesized that
the shift was mainly caused by the collapse in the demand for Danish CIS as discussed above.
Furthermore, while debt reduction, OGLlcredit lines and co-financing modalities can certainly be used
in an active and policy oriented manner, this does not appear to have been the case in general for
Danish BOP. Thus, the change probably took place more by default than by design. This feature of
Danish Aid is underscored by the fact that debt relief has, according to Danida (1994a: 8), not so far
been an integrated component of Danish programme aid in relation to the formulation of Danish views
on conditionalities and policy issues. On the contrary, only rather vague references to the underlying
set of assumptions and the general policy trend in negotiations in the Paris Club and similar fora can
10
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be identified.
Consequently, while the Danida approach taken in the area of debt relief amounts to fully backing
the policy line and conditionalities pursued by the World Bank and other multilateral agencies, this
has been done in an implicit way, rather than reflecting clear policy choices. At the same time,
Danida has in line with the increasing criticisms of the 'orthodox' approach to stabilization and
structural adjustment tried to influence the World Bank through its Board of Governors and other
available formal and informal channels. Whether such initiatives have been successful is left as an
open question here; but it is a fact that recent concerns expressed by the World Bank are much more
in line with traditional Danish aid priorities such as poverty alleviation and cross cutting themes
related to gender, the environment etc. (see Danida, 1994a, for an elaboration of these points).
A more direct Danish involvement in the policy formulation process and the identification of explicit
aid-eonditionalities might have been possible in relation to OGLlcredit lines and co-financing with the
World Bank. Nevertheless, it is also in this area difficult to identify a clear-cut and active link
between the use of Danish BOP support and declared aid priorities. Existing studies (such as Danida,
1988; Danida, 1994a; and T&B Consult, 1994) consistently recommend that Denmark should enter
more directly into policy dialogue and develop its capacity for independent assessments, taking as a
starting point discnssions with the World Bank, IMF, other bilateral donors and the recipient country.
Finally, credit lines have in large measure also during recent years been tied to procurement in
Denmark, which is in stark contrast to the liberalization policies pursued by structural adjustment.
In spite of the above, it can by way of conclusion be highlighted, first, that it has been a well defined
Danish policy that tying should not, in principle, exclude goods produced in developing countries at
competitive prices. The extent to which this policy has had any impact, in practice, is not, however,
entirely clear. Secondly, counterpart funds generated through the sale of inputs to domestic producers,
goods for final consumption as well as foreign exchange should according to Danish guidelines end
up with either the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank without strings attached.
Denmark has in the above way tried at the policy level to counter the distorting effects, which are
inevitable if counterpart payments are not collected in a systematic and timely manner. Yet, the fact
that this approach has not always been followed consistently in practice is well documented (see for
II
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example T&B Consult, 1994, and Danida, 1994a). It has in this regard been speculated that Danish
Embassies have focused too much on the need to disburse and consequently have not pursued the
issue of payment of counter values to the extent desirable. It is hard to gauge the exact extent to
which this may be a correct interpretation. Nevertheless, despite the macro nature of BOP support,
it is widely reported that the overall monitoring of macroeconomic developments is inadequate. There
are, moreover, examples such the case of Kenya where Danish BOP support was not suspended even
if the adjustment programme clearly went off track, and the World Bank stopped lending, leaving the
underlying rationale for the lending and release of funds open to varying interpretations.
On the other hand, by striving to have as few strings attached to local currency generated as possible
and avoiding undue additional demand pressure caused by the incomes generated by the supply of
foreign goods, Danida has certainly attempted to strengthen the capacity of local government
institutions to achieve macroeconomic balance. This is so even if it must be squarely recognized that
the Danish amounts involved in general have been of a relatively limited scale.
4. EVAWATION STUDIES
The most comprehensive study of Danish BOP to date was completed in 1994 (f&B Consult, 1994).
It consists of a main report and five country case studies. The case studies of Bangladesh, Nicaragua,
Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda contain a briefdescription of the overall macroeconomic situation
in the country concerned, including a listing of the most important ongoing economic and political
,
changes, followed by a descriptive appraisal of the BOP provided. Finally, all studies discuss various
dimensions of BOP as a policy related instrument. These evaluations touch upon a wide range of
issues, and an attempt is made in what follows to characterize them in accordance with the guidelines
provided by White (1996), before discussing briefly the other available studies in this field. For a
tentative overview of how the studies can be classified (see Table 6).
4.1. BOP to Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda
The case studies under this heading review the individual components of BOP separately, but except
for co-financing with the World Bank, the analyses are focused on microeconomic and administrative
issues. No quantified microeconomic cost-benefit analysis is conducted, although an attempt is made
to clarify the kinds of commodities imported and assess in qualitative terms the relevance of the
products supplied and their effect on capacity utilisation in the respective firms and sectors involved.
12
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Table 6 Classification of Balance of Payment Support Evaluations
Countries Micro Macro Macro funds Administration
Bangladesh (1994)' X X
Nicaragua (1994) X X
SAP with World Bank X
Tanzania (1994) X X
Uganda (1994) X X
SAP with World Bank X
Mozambique (1994) X X
SAP with World Bank X
Tanzania (1988) X X
Tanzania (1987) X X
Mozambique (1989) X X
Note: (1) The six evaluations/reviews from 1994 was all carried out by the same
evaluation team. The evaluations consisted of all BOP Support given to the five
countries.
It is, in particular, noted that there have been problems with collecting counterpart funds, and that
this and other distortions have been the major reason for local companies demanding Danish products.
There is, however, no quantified information available to assess the microeconomic dimensions of
the counterpart issue in more concrete terms.
When it comes to administrative issues, the evaluation studies are in addition to detailed accounts of
what actually was delivered, where and when, focused on the problems connected with the collection
of counterpart funds. Other administrative shortcomings, like administrative difficulties with
disbursements, transportation obstacles, problems with local governments etc, are evaluated in brief
terms only, and some of the case studies have relatively little to say in these regards. Yet, all five
studies put great emphasis on making concrete recommendations as to the way in which future BOP
should be designed and disbursed.
13
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As regards the macroeconomic effects of increased funds made available through BOP and the impact
of modified policies, there are differences in the way in which co-financing with the World Bank in
support of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) is treated as compared to the other BOP
instruments. The analysis of CIS funds is not carried out within a macroeconomic framework, and
the possible effects on macroeconomic indicators (I.e., inflation, growth, public sector budgets etc)
are not pursued in detail, although some qualitative observations on possible macro effects of the
goods supplied are made throughout the various reports. Also the question of tying and related
problems are discussed at length. Nevertheless, while the fungibility issue is referred to in the main
summary report, it is not taken up in the individual country studies and possible inflationary effects
are left unaddressed. The CIS picture also manifests itself with regard to credit lines, debt relief and
OGL, and the main argument put forward for not analyzing the impact of these kinds of Danish BOP
at the macroeconomic level is their relatively limited size in the overall picture.
On the other hand, in evaluating co-financing with the World Bank, descriptive macroeconomic
reviews are included. The metbodology adopted is before-versus-after, and the analyses are limited
to listings of policy changes and variations in important macroeconomic variables based on various
World Bank reports and similar sources of information. Thus, little can, in fact, be deduced about
the actual impact of policy reforms and the macro funds made available. It follows that no attempt
is made to carry out independent macroeconomic modelling or quantified analyses of the underlying
behavioral relationships in the respective countries. Finally, it is repeated that it is impossible to
,
isolate the macroeconomic effects of Danish BOP.
4.2. Other BOP studies
The above studies were, as noted, focused on microeconomic and administrative topics. The same
accounts for the studies by CASA (1989), Cooksey (1987), and Danida (1988) covering BOP
activities in Tanzania and Mozambique such as the supply of industrial tallow for bar soap production.
None of these studies address macro issues in detail although questions related to tying are touched
upon in addition to general comments about the usefulness of commodity assistance as a tool in
support of economic recovery policies. Instead these three evaluations emphasize a series of delivery
and technical production problems, the quality of the supplies and the effect on capacity utilization
in addition to addressing issues related to the payment of counterpart funds etc.
14
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The last group of studies to be commented on include a series of internal reviews carried out in some
of the Danida programme countries under the leadership of Danida staff. These studies are not
published, and the following is therefore limited to some remarks about their general content and the
methodology applied. By way of introduction these reviews normally include a brief macroeconomic
survey of the country in question based on a critical reading of available statistics and short visits to
the country concerned. Brief accounts of the economic reform process (including as well the
functioning of foreign exchange auctioning systems) may also be included in addition to statements
about existing savings- and foreign exchange gaps. Yet, no independent formal analyses or data
collection took place at the macro level. The issue of fungibility is seldom addressed in a coherent
manner, and linkages with economic and social indicators of development and the impact of BOP are
discussed in qualitative terms only.
Hence, also the internal Danida reviews normally put considerable emphasis on microeconomic issues
in addition to addressing administrative procedures and topics related to effective programme
management. Consequently, existing procedures and their adequacy, disbursements rates, the access
of importers to foreign currency and potential economic rents and distortions, the auditing of
payments of counterpart funds and problems created by complex tying rules are normally discussed
at great length. Moreover, while comments may be made on capacity utilization, explicit cost-benefit
analysis hereof is not undertaken. Recommendations are often made on the composition of future
BOP and the procedures to be followed, but these suggestions are usually kept in rather broad and
generalized terms. However, this should come as no surprise. The internal Danida reviews have
been carried out under great time pressure as quick desk studies combined with short country visits
leaving very limited possibility for more in-depth and quantified analysis. Finally, these reviews do
not, in fact, have the status of being evaluations.
S. CONCLUSION
Danish BOP has been relatively small as compared to BOP from other like minded donors, and
Commodity Import Support (CIS) has by far been the most important modality used. Danish CIS
cannot in general be characterized as policy based aid, and gap-based considerations did not form an
identifiable part of decision making matrices. CIS was, instead, largely demand driven in the sense
that commodities were made available to local importers, who derived substantial economic rents due
inter alia to exchange rate overvaluation and incomplete collection of counterpart funds. At the same
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time, CIS was useful to Danida as a means of quickly disbursing in a residual manner unspent project
balances building up due to delivery constraints caused by faltering absorptive capacity.
This study also reveals that a major structural change is underway in Danish BOP. Other BOP
modalities such as OGL support, credit lines and cofinancing with the World Bank are on the rise.
Nevertheless, the extent to which this lending can be termed policy based is questionable. On the
contrary, it would appear that active Danida involvement in the policy dialogue and in the
establishment of policy conditionalities has been, at best, rather limited. Monitoring of
macroeconomic issues and independent analyses is inadequate, and BOP disbursements have continued
to reflect the need to spend funds in a residual manner, while at the same time increasing the share
allocated to procurement in Denmark. Similarly, no initiatives have apparently been taken together
with other donors to ensure greater continuity in BOP disbursements, which have fluctuated widely
from one year to the next with no reference to the needs of receiving countries.
Finally, existing evaluations and reviews are mainly focused on micro- and administrative topics with
only very scarce analysis of the intricate issues linked to the macroeconomic effects of BOP funds and
adjustment policies. Reflections about macro impact are limited to comparing before-and-after
situations combined with cursory review of mainly World Bank data and studies. In sum, very little
is, indeed, known about the overall impact of Danish BOP. It can therefore safely be concluded that
this area of economic enquiry is certainly ripe for further research both in relation to the need for well
,
defined evaluation techniques and in the form of comparative country case analysis of BOP
experiences. This is so, in particular, given the commitment stated in a variety of Danida documents
to develop independent assessments of the ongoing reforms in some of the major Danida programme
countries.
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THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Enzo Caputo
1. INTRODUCTION
The present paper has been prepared by Dr. Enzo Caputo, of Development Researchers Network
(Rome), on behalf of the Institute of Social Studies (The Hague), to be presented in the workshop on
the Evaluation of Balance of Payment support programmes, organised by ISS in The Hague the 12
and 13 October 1995.
The subject of the paper is the EU' experience in the relevant field. The author thanks the staff of
the European Commission, particularly Mr Sam McPherson (consultant at the DGVIII Evaluation
Unit), for their collaboration in data collection and analysis. The opinions expressed in the paper
retlect the point of view of the author only.
The paper is divided in three sections: the tirst section provides an overview of the relatively recent
EU experience in Balance of Payments (BOP) support programmes; the second section considers the
evaluations carried out by EU on the relevant programmes, including the actual findings and the
methodological issues related to these works; the third section outlines some basic concerns on
evaluation methodology, or lessons from the experience, arising from the works carried out and the
related debate in the European Commission.
2. OVERVIEW OF EU PROGRAMMES
Lome III Convention
In 1986, EU began to detine an approach to BOP support programmes in African Caribbean and
Pacific Countries2 (ACP) countries and subsquently launched the first programmes in 1987. Lome
III Convention, with art. 188, provided the framework for such a start up. The article establishes
that "sectoral development and import programmes" may be considered to support economic growth
and basic needs in recipient countries. The funds were to be drawn from the National Indicative
Programmes and no explicit linkages with structural adjustment agreements were required for their
utilisation.
In 1987, a Special Debt Programme provided additional resources and was targeted on those highly
indebted countries which had adopted a structural adjustment programme approved by the IMF or
World Bank and/or had undertaken macro-economic adjustment policies acceptable to the EU.
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